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Fix minor typos.

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Stephen Chung 2020-06-20 12:06:04 +08:00
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Rhai - Embedded Scripting for Rust
![GitHub last commit](https://img.shields.io/github/last-commit/jonathandturner/rhai) ![GitHub last commit](https://img.shields.io/github/last-commit/jonathandturner/rhai)
[![Travis (.org)](https://img.shields.io/travis/jonathandturner/rhai)](http://travis-ci.org/jonathandturner/rhai) [![Travis (.org)](https://img.shields.io/travis/jonathandturner/rhai)](http://travis-ci.org/jonathandturner/rhai)
[![license](https://img.shields.io/github/license/jonathandturner/rhai)](https://github.com/license/jonathandturner/rhai) [![license](https://img.shields.io/github/license/jonathandturner/rhai)](https://github.com/license/jonathandturner/rhai)
[![crates.io](https://img.shields.io/crates/v/rhai.svg)](https::/crates.io/crates/rhai/) [![crates.io](https://img.shields.io/crates/v/rhai.svg)](https:/crates.io/crates/rhai/)
![crates.io](https://img.shields.io/crates/d/rhai) ![crates.io](https://img.shields.io/crates/d/rhai)
[![API Docs](https://docs.rs/rhai/badge.svg)](https://docs.rs/rhai/) [![API Docs](https://docs.rs/rhai/badge.svg)](https://docs.rs/rhai/)
@ -73,21 +73,21 @@ This is similar to some dynamic languages where most of the core functionalities
Installation Installation
------------ ------------
Install the Rhai crate on [`crates.io`](https::/crates.io/crates/rhai/) by adding this line to `dependencies`: Install the Rhai crate on [`crates.io`](https:/crates.io/crates/rhai/) by adding this line to `dependencies`:
```toml ```toml
[dependencies] [dependencies]
rhai = "0.15.2" rhai = "0.15.2"
``` ```
Use the latest released crate version on [`crates.io`](https::/crates.io/crates/rhai/): Use the latest released crate version on [`crates.io`](https:/crates.io/crates/rhai/):
```toml ```toml
[dependencies] [dependencies]
rhai = "*" rhai = "*"
``` ```
Crate versions are released on [`crates.io`](https::/crates.io/crates/rhai/) infrequently, so to track the Crate versions are released on [`crates.io`](https:/crates.io/crates/rhai/) infrequently, so to track the
latest features, enhancements and bug fixes, pull directly from GitHub: latest features, enhancements and bug fixes, pull directly from GitHub:
```toml ```toml
@ -2249,7 +2249,7 @@ foo(); // prints "None."
Members and methods Members and methods
------------------- -------------------
Properties and methods in a Rust custom type registered with the [`Engine`] can be called just like in Rust. Properties and methods in a Rust custom type registered with the [`Engine`] can be called just like a regular function in Rust.
Unlike functions defined in script (for which all arguments are passed by _value_), Unlike functions defined in script (for which all arguments are passed by _value_),
native Rust functions may mutate the object (or the first argument if called in normal function call style). native Rust functions may mutate the object (or the first argument if called in normal function call style).
@ -2502,20 +2502,20 @@ a script so that it does not consume more resources that it is allowed to.
The most important resources to watch out for are: The most important resources to watch out for are:
* **Memory**: A malicous script may continuously grow a [string], an [array] or [object map] until all memory is consumed. * **Memory**: A malicious script may continuously grow a [string], an [array] or [object map] until all memory is consumed.
It may also create a large [array] or [object map] literal that exhausts all memory during parsing. It may also create a large [array] or [object map] literal that exhausts all memory during parsing.
* **CPU**: A malicous script may run an infinite tight loop that consumes all CPU cycles. * **CPU**: A malicious script may run an infinite tight loop that consumes all CPU cycles.
* **Time**: A malicous script may run indefinitely, thereby blocking the calling system which is waiting for a result. * **Time**: A malicious script may run indefinitely, thereby blocking the calling system which is waiting for a result.
* **Stack**: A malicous script may attempt an infinite recursive call that exhausts the call stack. * **Stack**: A malicious script may attempt an infinite recursive call that exhausts the call stack.
Alternatively, it may create a degenerated deep expression with so many levels that the parser exhausts the call stack Alternatively, it may create a degenerated deep expression with so many levels that the parser exhausts the call stack
when parsing the expression; or even deeply-nested statement blocks, if nested deep enough. when parsing the expression; or even deeply-nested statement blocks, if nested deep enough.
* **Overflows**: A malicous script may deliberately cause numeric over-flows and/or under-flows, divide by zero, and/or * **Overflows**: A malicious script may deliberately cause numeric over-flows and/or under-flows, divide by zero, and/or
create bad floating-point representations, in order to crash the system. create bad floating-point representations, in order to crash the system.
* **Files**: A malicous script may continuously [`import`] an external module within an infinite loop, * **Files**: A malicious script may continuously [`import`] an external module within an infinite loop,
thereby putting heavy load on the file-system (or even the network if the file is not local). thereby putting heavy load on the file-system (or even the network if the file is not local).
Furthermore, the module script may simply [`import`] itself in an infinite recursion. Furthermore, the module script may simply [`import`] itself in an infinite recursion.
Even when modules are not created from files, they still typically consume a lot of resources to load. Even when modules are not created from files, they still typically consume a lot of resources to load.
* **Data**: A malicous script may attempt to read from and/or write to data that it does not own. If this happens, * **Data**: A malicious script may attempt to read from and/or write to data that it does not own. If this happens,
it is a severe security breach and may put the entire system at risk. it is a severe security breach and may put the entire system at risk.
### Maximum length of strings ### Maximum length of strings
@ -2681,7 +2681,7 @@ Rhai by default limits function calls to a maximum depth of 128 levels (16 level
This limit may be changed via the `Engine::set_max_call_levels` method. This limit may be changed via the `Engine::set_max_call_levels` method.
When setting this limit, care must be also taken to the evaluation depth of each _statement_ When setting this limit, care must be also taken to the evaluation depth of each _statement_
within the function. It is entirely possible for a malicous script to embed a recursive call deep within the function. It is entirely possible for a malicious script to embed a recursive call deep
inside a nested expression or statement block (see [maximum statement depth](#maximum-statement-depth)). inside a nested expression or statement block (see [maximum statement depth](#maximum-statement-depth)).
The limit can be disabled via the [`unchecked`] feature for higher performance The limit can be disabled via the [`unchecked`] feature for higher performance
@ -2726,7 +2726,7 @@ engine.set_max_expr_depths(50, 5); // allow nesting up to 50 layers of
Beware that there may be multiple layers for a simple language construct, even though it may correspond Beware that there may be multiple layers for a simple language construct, even though it may correspond
to only one AST node. That is because the Rhai _parser_ internally runs a recursive chain of function calls to only one AST node. That is because the Rhai _parser_ internally runs a recursive chain of function calls
and it is important that a malicous script does not panic the parser in the first place. and it is important that a malicious script does not panic the parser in the first place.
Functions are placed under stricter limits because of the multiplicative effect of recursion. Functions are placed under stricter limits because of the multiplicative effect of recursion.
A script can effectively call itself while deep inside an expression chain within the function body, A script can effectively call itself while deep inside an expression chain within the function body,
@ -2739,7 +2739,7 @@ Make sure that `C x ( 5 + F ) + S` layered calls do not cause a stack overflow,
* `S` = maximum statement depth at global level. * `S` = maximum statement depth at global level.
A script exceeding the maximum nesting depths will terminate with a parsing error. A script exceeding the maximum nesting depths will terminate with a parsing error.
The malicous `AST` will not be able to get past parsing in the first place. The malicious `AST` will not be able to get past parsing in the first place.
This check can be disabled via the [`unchecked`] feature for higher performance This check can be disabled via the [`unchecked`] feature for higher performance
(but higher risks as well). (but higher risks as well).